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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Amongst other things, this paper aims to address complexities and challenges faced by regulators in 
identifying and assessing risk, problems arising from different perceptions of risk, and solutions aimed 
at countering problems of risk regulation. It will approach these issues through an assessment of 
explanations put forward to justify the growing importance of risks, well known risk theories such as 
cultural theory, risk society theory and governmentality theory. In addressing the problems posed as a 
result of the difficulty in quantifying risks, it will consider a means whereby risks can be quantified 
reasonably without the consequential effects which result from the dual nature of risk that is, risks 
emanating from the management of institutional risks. Current attempts by the European Union to 
regulate risks will also be discussed. This discussion will be facilitated through a consideration of 
recent developments in the EU which are aimed at addressing risks posed by hedge funds. The results 
obtained from a consultation process on hedge funds, and which will be discussed in the concluding 
section of this paper, reveal whether the systemic relevance of hedge funds and prime brokerage 
regulation need to be reviewed. Questions also addressed during the consultation process, which 
include whether indirect prudential regulation is inadequate to shield the financial system from hedge 
funds’ failure and whether prudential authorities have necessary tools to monitor exposures of the 
core financial system to hedge funds, will also be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINANCIAL REGULATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT: ADDRESSING RISK 
CHALLENGES IN A CHANGING FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Introduction 
 
Different explanations have been given as to why risk has become central across regulatory and 
governmental circles and these explanations are partly influenced by different approaches as to what 
risk is.1 One view in attempting to account for risk as a strategic organising principle in the public 
sector, attributes the specific needs of government.2 Political scientists, however suggest that the 
adoption of the language and practices of risk reflects a deeper, more complex process, one of 
“political isomorphism”.3 According to this view, risk becomes accepted and embedded in one 
organisation or institution such that it acquires recognition within other organisations and institutions.4 
Other explanations, mainly from socio-cultural disciplines suggest that the importance of risk derives 
from issues related to control, accountability, responsibility and blame in late modern society.5  
 
Two well-known theoretical perspectives addressing these are termed “risk society” theory and 
“governmentality” theory.6 The “risk society” approach is one that identifies broad socio-economic 
and political changes which occurred in late modern societies. Alongside these changes, loss of faith 
in institutions and authorities and a greater awareness of the limits and uncertainties linked to science 
and technology are identified.7  The term “governmentality” refers to specific types of government that 
have arisen in modern societies in line with liberalist and neo-liberalist approaches.8 It focuses on the 
exploration of how the identification of risks associated with certain behaviour or activities provide a 
way of exercising control over populations, groups or individuals in neo-liberal societies – in other 
words, identifying how risk is used as a “tool of governance” to shape behaviours.9 
The structure of this paper will accord with the above mentioned points. The paper therefore 
commences with a discussion based the first explanation of risk as an organizing principle. It will then 
consider the second view which will focus on how risk has become embedded in regulation – such 
process having taken place in two ways, namely, through a “quantitative expansion” and through a 
“qualitative shift towards the management of institutional risks:”10  Other explanations which have 
promulgated a focus on internal controls within financial organisations and institutions, namely such 
failures such as Barings, will also be considered. This will include a consideration of how internal 
controls have been transformed to risk management. These “socio cultural” explanations also relate to 
how risk is increasingly becoming embedded in organisations and institutions. The paper will then 
proceed to consider two theories, namely, the “risk society” theory and “governmentality”theory. A 
consideration of these theories will also pave way for the discussion on why difficulties in identifying 
and assessing risk have arisen and the solutions which have been proposed to counter such difficulties. 
In so doing it will facilitate a consideration of attempts by governments, and the EU in particular, to 
address risk challenges in the final section. 
                                                 
1 J Gray and  J Hamilton  Implementing Financial Regulation ( 2006) 5 
2 Ibid p 5 
3 ibid 
4 Ibid  
5 Ibid p 5 
6 Ibid  p 6; “Risk society” theory is related to the work of sociologists Beck and Giddens whilst 
“governmentality” theory is related to the work of French social thinker Foucault.  “Risk society” theory also 
suggests that the focus on risk in government and regulatory circles is a response to a general realisation that 
there are limits to the ability to know or control the uncertainties related to late modernity and to a public 
wanting to hold public decision-makers accountable; ibid p 8. 
7 Ibid  p 6 
8 Ibid p 9 
9 ibid 
10  See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics 
of Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92 
Definitions attributed to Risk 
 
Risks can be defined as “ the probabilities of physical harm due to given technological or other 
processes.”11 Three observations are noteworthy, namely:12  Firstly that social systems serve as 
environments in which such physical risks are always created and given effect; secondly, as a result, 
the degree of physical risks and the quality of social relations are directly related and; thirdly, that 
primary risk constitutes “social dependency upon institutions and actors” and that accessibility by 
most people affected by stated risks, to such institutions and actors, may be virtually impossible.  
 
Risk is also considered to be the difference between one’s perception and another’s perception. 
According to Douglas13, results from risk research have revealed that “the public” does not perceive 
risks in a similar way to experts. The difference between lay and expert opinion has resulted in “a 
whole new sub-branch of the psychology of risk.”14 In Warner’s view, risk can be regarded as “threat 
or danger whose perception will depend on the prevailing culture in which there are four major 
groups: hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists and individualists.”15 
 
Another definition of risk which is quite general, and which considers it to be the probability of a 
certain adverse event occurring during a defined time period or resulting from a specific challenge, 
draws distinctions between different types of risks – according to whether such risks are probabilistic 
or un predictable.16 
 
Problems associated with the definition and assessment of Risk 
 
According to Baldwin and Cave, the first challenge faced by regulators concerns the identification of 
risks that should be limited, not only according to a prioritised order, but in such a way which accords 
with public approval.17In their view, problems are evident due to the fact that issues accorded priority 
by the public may seem irrational to those accorded priority by experts.18 Within such a context, risk is 
considered to be multi dimensional and incapable of being reduced to simply a product of probability 
and consequences.19 The second regulatory challenge involves the management and regulation of risks 
in a manner which is effective and acceptable – particularly the stage during which intervention should 
occur.20 
 
Whilst Michael Power considers the more challenging issue as comprising of the management and 
limitation of the expansion of secondary risk management,21in Juul Andersen’s view, the existence of 
tight coupling makes risk in complex systems very difficult -if not impossible, to manage.22 This arises 
from the fact that whilst complexity makes risk unpredictable and it therefore needs to be controlled 
by dencentralized approaches, such tight coupling requires a centrally designed control system in order 
                                                 
11  U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications at page 4 
12  ibid 
13  M Douglas, Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory (1992) Routledge at page 11 
14  ibid 
15  See F Warner, ‘Calculated Risks’ (1993) Science and Public Affairs at page 45 
16  see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 138 
17  ibid at page 142 
18  Reasons for this are attributed to factors which may influence public’s perceptions of risks. These include the 
degree of personal control over the size or probability of the risk, familiarity with the risk, degree of 
perceived equity in sharing risks and benefits and voluntariness with which the risk is undertaken. Ibid at 
page 141 
19  ibid. However it is also added that such focus on individuals may downplay the degree to which perceptions 
are affected by a group, institutional and cultural factors. 
20  ibid at 143 
21  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
62 
22  TJ Andersen Perspectives on Strategic Risk Management (2006) Copenhagen Business School Press at page 
101 
to react quickly to problems. The fate of Arthur Andersen, it is further argued, could well be regarded 
as such an unpredictable systems failure in a relatively tightly coupled and complex system.23 
 
 
Explanations to why Risk has become so important 
Risk as an organising principle 
 
In considering the features that make risk such a vital tool for regulation, Rothstein et al conclude that 
….”risk provides an organizing concept for societal decision-making under uncertainty and is a key 
characteristic of modernity….as regulatory systems attempt to control events that have formerly been 
beyond control, the process of decision-making transforms those events into risks as a way of 
rationally managing the limits of regulation.”24 
 
As well as a means of describing what constitutes the subjects of regulation and related institutional 
threats, risk is increasingly being perceived as a procedure for the organisation of regulatory 
activities.25  
The utilisation of risk as a strategic organising principle is considered to be related to specific 
government needs26 and could also be argued to be linked to governmentality theory through the way 
in which risk is used as a tool of governance to shape regulatory behaviours. 
 
The embeddedness of risk in regulation 
 
The increasing connection between risk and regulation is apparent.27 Such fact is collaborated by the 
transformation of internal controls to risk management.28 It is maintained that the transformation of 
risk into internal controls is required for the operation of risk-based regulation, which in turn would 
facilitate the functioning of the risk management state.29 According to Rothstein30 et al, the 
incorporation of risks in regulatory processes has taken place in two ways namely: Through a 
quantitative process whereby risk analysis and risk management methods are increasingly being 
utilised in the regulation of “traditional and novel” risks, such risks being referred to as “societal 
risks”31. 
 
The second mode of incorporation involves the “qualitative shift towards the management of 
institutional risks”.32 There has been an increased focus on the risks of risk management.33 Such 
consequence of risk management has been referred to as the “duality of risk”.34 
                                                 
23  ibid at pages 101 and 102; However, though the Andersen culture was dysfunctional, neither the culture nor 
the structure of Andersen was considered to be significantly different from that of the other big accountancy 
firms; for more this, see ibid 
24  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 99 
25  ibid at page 97 
26  see Gray and Hamilton at page 5 
27  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 
50-58 
28  Also see ibid at page 24 
29  ibid  
30  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell “A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk” (2006) Economy and Society (35) 1 at page 92 
31  ibid 
32  ibid; institutional risks are implied to include risks encountered by institutions which are responsible for 
managing and regulating societal risks and/or legitimacy risks (to their rules and practices) - regardless of 
whether these institutions are state or non state institutions. 
33  ibid; See also M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 
Demos at pages 50-58 in which Power argues that reliance on internal controls may increase risk if it leads to 
an undermining of the knowledge of risk in other areas; despite the benefits of risk management, concerns are 
generated due to the fact that secondary risk management has become an accepted “organisational common 
sense” - reflecting the society’s loss in faith in its professions and public organisations. 
34  ibid and also see C Ciborra, ‘Digital Technologies and the Duality of Risk’(2004) CARR Discussion Paper 
 
However, the ever increasing inter connectedness between risk and regulation does not mean that both 
perfectly correspond to one another.35 This has given rise to compliance related issues for 
organisations. 
 
 
Developments in corporate governance 
 
In its White Paper on European governance of April 2001,36 the European Commission defines 
governance as “rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at 
[the] European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence”. In 2006, priorities37 were arranged by the EU Commission for “Modernizing Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU”.38 That same year, 8 corporate governance 
principles were issued by the Basel Committee.39  
 
Corporate governance tools are considered to be risk management strategies for the distinctive risk of 
failure by senior management to prevent the growth and development of risk.40 Modern risk 
management strategies have arisen from new institutions involved in the collection and statistical 
analysis of data required for activities like the census.41 
 
In his speech to the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA) EU Corporate 
Governance Summit, Charles McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, 
highlighted the fact that it was apparent that:42 
“poor, indeed, sometimes disastrous, risk management by financial institutions was partly to blame for 
the current financial turmoil. Risk management should be part of the strategy of the firm, and indeed 
the culture of the organisation. It is the duty of senior management in financial institutions to address 
this and it is the role of the board to oversee it. In their respective roles, both senior management and 
the board need to ensure a holistic approach to firm-wide – and group-wide -risk management.” 
 
He did not elaborate on how a firm’s internal risk management strategy could be best integrated but 
indicated the area which was likely to serve as an early indicator of faults in a firm’s management 
system, namely, the firm’s approach to transparency.43 
 
Risk Theories 
 
Risk society 
The theme of evolutionism is common to various theories of ‘simple’ modernisation.44 However, a  
different perspective is observed by Beck who views risks and unpredictability as the consequences of 
developments of science and industry.45 Furthermore, he argues that no one can be brought to book for 
                                                                                                                                                        
No 27, CARR, LSE London 
35  See B Hutter and M Power “Risk Management and Business Regulation” at page 2 
36 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf (last visited 2 April 2009) 
37  Including shareholders’ rights and obligations, internal control, the modernization and simplification of 
European company law. 
38  C Mallin Corporate Governance 2007 Oxford University Press at page 35 
39  See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs122.pdf?noframes=1 (last visited 2 April 2008) 
40  M Power Organized Uncertainty: Designing A World of Risk Management 2007 Oxford University Press at 
page 10 
41  ibid at page 12 
42  See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/08/518&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
43  ibid 
44 See U Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992) London: Sage Publications at page 2. Such 
theories range from those of Habermas to Max to Parsonian sociology. 
45  ibid at page 2 
unpredictable events in the “risk society”.46 Furthermore, the ability of regulators to regulate 
successfully depends on the level of efficiency and coherence of “institutionally complex regulatory 
regimes”, hence the limited ability of regulators to control societal risks.47 In Beck’s view, 
modernization must become reflexive and such modernization not only involves structural change, but 
a dynamic relationship between social structures and social agents.48 Along with others, Beck argues 
that risks of late modernity differ in type and magnitude from those which previously existed.49  
Furthermore they maintain that, in the ‘risk society’ in which we now live, risks are no longer imposed 
from external sources but are ‘manufactured’ as “products of mankind’s decisions, options, science, 
politics, industries, markets and capital.”50 
 
Cultural Theory 
Cultural theorists on the other hand, argue that attitudes to risk differ according to cultural 
preferences.51 However, it is argued that it is highly unlikely that cultural theory would be able to 
predict risk perceptions in particular situations.52 Furthermore, Ottedal et al maintain that cultural 
theory’s explanatory ability to explain how people perceive and act upon the world around them may 
easily be overestimated.53 Cultural theory proceeds with the assumption that a culture consists of 
persons which hold one another mutually to account. 54 There is an attempt by such persons to live at a 
level of being held accountable, which is identical to a level at which such a person would want to 
hold others accountable.55 From this perspective, culture is ladened with political implications of 
mutual accountability.56 Rather than the perception that an isolated individual would check every piece 
of information in such a manner devoid of prejudice or moral commitment, the person is perceived to 
investigate possible information “through a collectively constructed censor set to a given standard of 
accountability.” Since assimilated knowledge or the rejection of “mere noise” is based on a criterion 
which considers whether the new conception or fact will consolidate the subject’s preferred political 
scheme, in Douglas’ opinion, it would be fruitless to undertake a study of risk perception without a 
systematic consideration of cultural preferences.57 
 
 
Governmentality approach to risk 
 
The “governmentality” theory is related to the work of Foucault.58 According to his approach, risk is 
generally considered to be a concept which is socially produced in its entirety.59 Furthermore, no 
external environment compels society to respond to risk.60 A broader view of government, which the 
notion of governmentality embraces, can be found in Mitchell Dean’s definition of government: 
                                                 
46  ibid; In contrast to societal risks, Rothstein et al maintain that it is much easier to account for institutional 
risks through the transformation of behaviours and outcomes that could not be recorded previously or were 
considered to be acceptable. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The 
Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 96 
47  ibid at page 95 
48  ibid 
49  See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics 
of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 94 
50  Also see R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (1999) Oxford 
University Press at page 141 
51  ibid at 142 
52  S Ottedal, B Moen, H Klempe and T Rundow ‘Explaining Risk Perception: An evaluation of Cultural 
Theory’ < http://www.svt.ntnu.no/psy/Torbjorn.Rundmo/Psychometric_paradigm.pdf> 
53  ibid at pages 5 and 6 
54  M Douglas ‘Risk and Blame’ Routlegde at page 31 
55  ibid 
56  ibid 
57  ibid at pages 31 and 32 
58  See M Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in G Burchell et al (eds), The Foucault Effect at pages 87-104, also J 
Bratich, J Packer and C McCarthy Foucault, Cultural Studies and Governmentality (2003) State University 
of New York Press  
59  See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 4 
60  ibid 
 
 
“Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity 
of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that 
seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for 
definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, 
effects and outcomes”.61 
 
 
 
 
Theory of Risk Colonisation 
 
This theory is founded on the dynamic linkage between societal and institutional risks - thereby paving 
the way for a new explanatory model of “contemporary regulatory development” which recommends a 
research schedule for the study of the separate fields of risk and regulation.62 It is also an attempt to 
explain what is considered to be some of the “conceptual consequences” of efforts aimed at regulating 
risk.63 
 
 
Criticism which revolves round Beck’s concept of risk is namely, that risk is too restricted in 
accounting for complexities involving governmental risk strategies and rationalities or socio cultural 
perceptions and responses to risk.64 A wider approach which is in line with the concept of reflexive 
modernization commences with uncertainty instead of risk.65 The distinction between risk and 
uncertainty is as follows: Risk is traditionally associated with probability calculation and this suggests 
that an event can be predicted and controlled.66 Uncertainty however is not capable of measurement 
and deals with possibilities incapable of calculation which are based on guesswork and judgment.67 It 
is also added that uncertainty has to be defined acknowledging the possibility of unpredictable 
outcomes rather than adopting an approach which aims to transform uncertainty into certainty.68 
 
The functionalist view on risk, that is those works which are frequently related to those of Douglas and 
Wildavsky, is principally criticised for its oversimplified interpretation of quite complicated and ever 
changing processes  of how risk is approached.69 The ‘socio-cultural’ approach and ‘risk culture’ try to 
address the functionalist view on risk by targeting more complex and changing processes which 
involve risk in every day life.70 One advantage of these approaches is namely, that responses to risk 
are generated.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 See T Bennett ‘Culture and Governmentality’ in C McCarthy and J Packer (eds) Foucault, Cultural Studies 
and Governmentality 2003) State University of New York Press at page 47; M Dean, Governmentality. 
Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999) London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi: Sage 1999 at page 11 
62  Rothstein et al at page 107 
63  ibid at page 108 
64  See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 1 
65  ibid, also see W Bonss, Vom Risiko: Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit in der Moderne (1995) Hamburg: 
hamburger Edition 
66 J Gray and J Hamilton,  Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice  (2006) 20 
67 ibid 
68  see See J Zinn, ‘Recent Developments in Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty’ (2005) at page 2 
69  ibid at page 3 
70  ibid 
71  ibid 
Quantification of Risks 
 
The focus placed on the quantification of risks in various jurisdictions, varies according to the degree 
to which the decision making processes are subject to legal challenge and review, and whether there 
has been a tradition of independent regulatory agencies.72  
 
In order to overcome the myths surrounding the quantification and control of risks, “risks must be 
made auditable and governable.”73 In the attempt to make risk auditable, the role assumed by risk 
management has been transformed to that which is synonymous with that of an appropriately managed 
organisation which is internally and externally in control of the way it “handles” uncertainty.74 
 
 
Since societal risks are difficult to quantify, it could be argued that focus should be placed on 
preventing, detecting and rectifying the effects of institutional risks. Moreover, societal risks 
(excluding those risks attributed to “force majeure”), it can be argued, are consequential of the 
systemic effects of institutional risks. Hence the control of the source (that is, institutional risks) would 
be an effective way of containing the uncontrollable effects of societal risks.75 Risk management of 
institutional risks, even though this generates risks (which are the consequence of an omission of other 
significant risks), can be undertaken using the audit risk model – especially since the assessment of 
risks, based on differences in perceptions76, is so subjective. 
 
Successful management of institutional risks is dependent on many factors, namely, accuracy – 
inaccurate assessments of societal risks may further exacerbate the difficulty in managing institutional 
risks.77 Furthermore, methodological challenges and the degree to which other decision shaping factors 
are aligned the success of risk management, also contribute to the effectiveness of the management of 
institutional risks.78 Even where institutional risks which emanate from the government and the 
judiciary are successfully managed through risk based procedures, there may still be exposure to 
institutional risks from external sources.79 
 
 
The audit risk model not only requires the auditor to have an understanding of the client’s business 
and industry, systems used in processing transactions, qualifications of personnel engaged in 
accounting procedures, policies related to preparation of client’s financial statements but also requires 
that auditors have a knowledge of company’s internal controls.80 
                                                 
72  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101 
73  See M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at 
page 10; also see U Beck, Risk Society – Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage, 1992) 
74  M Power, The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at page 
40 
75  Whilst Power has argued that societal and institutional risk management are closely related, Rothstein et al 
contend that institutional risk management is stimulated by the ‘residual failures of societal risk management’ 
and that a focus on institutional risk management could also define the perception and management of 
societal risks. In other words, they emphasize the importance of concentrating not only on the management of 
societal risks, but also on the management of institutional risks. See H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A 
Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of Societal and Institutional Risk at page 103 
76  Attitudes to risk vary with individuals and may be different at different levels of an organization. “Risk 
attitudes or appetites may also vary across different aspects of the same risk, may in reality not correspond to 
any stated appetite and may change with new or better information.” See M Power, The Risk Management of 
Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty2004 Demos at pages 19 and 20. Also see B Hutter, Risk 
and Regulation (2000) Oxford: Oxford University Press 
77  H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell ‘A Theory of Risk Colonization: The Spiralling Regulatory Logics of 
Societal and Institutional Risk at page 101 
78  ibid 
79  ibid at 102 
80  ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf> at pages 175,176 (last 
visited 25 March 2009); also see <http://www.aicpa.org/download/members/div/auditstd/SAS107.PDF> page 
 
Traditional auditing techniques involve auditors performing tests to find out the level of risks which 
may exist in an entity. These risks consist of three components namely: inherent risks, control risks 
and detection risks and they all contribute to the audit risk81.  The audit risk models is denoted by the 
following equation: 
 
 AR = IR * CR*DR (where AR represents audit risk, IR represents inherent risk, CR represents 
control risk and DR represents detection risk) 
 
Inherent risks82 are those risks which emanate as a result of the nature of the business entity, control 
risks83 are those risks resulting from reliance on the internal controls functioning within the business 
whilst detection risk is the risk that the auditor would not be able to detect material misstatements 
during procedures aimed at detecting such. 
 
Inherent and control risks are outside the control of  auditors and since these risks are outside auditors' 
control, the consequence is that the higher the assessed levels of inherent and control risk, the lower 
the detection risk must be if the desired overall level of audit risk is to be achieved.84 The level of 
detection risk can be varied through auditors increasing substantive procedures, that is statistical 
sampling.85 Substantive  procedures are usually costly and auditors who place reliance on the internal 
controls in order to support the reduced use of substantive procedures need to show that the assessed 
level of control risk is low.86 This is done through the performance of tests of controls. Where internal 
control weaknesses are discovered, this does not necessarily mean that more tests of control should be 
performed. Where performance of such tests of control would not be potentially cost-effective, the use 
of predominantly substantive procedures is recommended straightaway.87 A preliminary determination 
of the control risk is required where there is potential for cost effectiveness. If this pre determined risk 
is high, then a predominantly  substantive approach is recommended. If the control risk is low, then 
test of the internal controls are to be performed to confirm the preliminary assessment of control risk. 
Following confirmation of a low pre determined level of control risk, a reduced level of substantive 
procedures can then be carried out.88  
 
Materiality is provided for in the audit risk model as auditors are not required to account for every 
misstatement within a financial statement – only material misstatements need be accounted for.89 
Furthermore, the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures is vital to the model. Auditors are also 
required to ascertain “fraud risks” which take into consideration qualities of both inherent and control 
risk.90 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
5 of 20 
81 This is defined as the probability that an auditor may unknowingly fail to adjust an opinion which is 
materially misstated in the financial statements; U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement 
Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges  (2002) page p 38 
82 Inherent risk can also be defined as the susceptibility of an account balance to material error; ibid p 38 
83 Risk that error could occur and not be prevented or detected by internal controls 
84 See  G Cosserat, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870> 
85 ibid 
86 ibid 
87 ibid 
88 See  G Cosserat, 'Audit Strategy'  1 February 1999, 
<http://www.accaglobal.com/publications/studentaccountant/49870> 
89  Also see ‘The Audit Risk Model’ <http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/appendixa.pdf > at page 177 
90  ibid 
Whilst according to some, the audit risk model has been relatively successful, its focus on internal use 
has been said to contribute to the existence of inherent problems in external procedures.91 This was 
soon highlighted in a study on expectations gap, following its introduction.92 
 
Limitations of the audit risk model 
 
The audit risk model does not account for certain risks which the auditor is exposed to. Examples of 
such risks include loss or injury to their professional practice from litigation, adverse publicity or other 
events which relate to the audited financial statements.93 Those risks which are not accounted for 
within the audit risk model are generally referred to as “engagement risk”, “client risk” or “client 
continuance (or acceptance) risk”94. 
 
Furthermore, the definition of audit risk does not consider the risk that the auditor may mistakenly 
deduce that financial statements are materially misstated.95 Where such situation arises, the auditor 
simply makes a re consideration or extends audit procedures with requests that specific tasks be 
performed by management to re evaluate the relevance of the financial statements.96 The audit risk 
model’s tendency to ostracize certain user groups from the system to the environments, has been 
highlighted.97 
 
 
Avoiding the Risks of Risk Management 
 
Power argues that to move beyond such “risk management driven privatization of the public sphere”, a 
new idea of risk which incorporates types of leadership at state, regulatory and corporate levels, and 
which is able to develop a language of risk, understood by the public and which expressly allows for 
the possibility of failure without this being understood as a way of “passing the buck”, will be 
required.98 
 
“Soft management systems” which are able to address uncertainties need to be designed and a balance 
should be struck between the role of calculative methods and other softer forms such as images and 
normative.99 
 
In Power’s view, the problems relating to the use of quantitative techniques for risk, namely, that of 
‘duality of risk’, which embodies Information and Communication Technology (ICT), should not 
restrict its application where appropriate.100 He however adds that there is need for a “second order 
intelligence” in organizations which implement such techniques.101 
 
“Calculative solutions to technical problems work well in situations where there is an available 
database which is large, clearly defined and complete, and where a high degree of 
organizational and political consent about the nature of the ‘risk object’ exists.”102 
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‘Intelligent risk management’ is considered to be a balance between the role assumed by calculative 
techniques and models and other forms which are inclusive of narratives and images.103 
 
Justifying regulatory decisions 
 
According to Baldwin and Cave, risk regulators encounter problems with the search for legitimation as 
a result of differences between the lay and experts’ perceptions of risk.104  In order to justify their 
regulatory decisions, given the differences in perceptions in particular, two responses based on an 
expertise rationale and on the accountability, due process rationale are advanced.105 Stephen Breyer’s 
illustration of the expertise approach is provided by Baldwin and Cave who argue that the difficulty 
with his suggestion stems from the fact that it focuses on legitimation through expertise at the expense 
of legitimation through focus on democratic policy-making, accountability and due process through 
participatory means.106 
 
In Breyer’s view, regulation of significant health risks is affected by three serious problems which 
result in a “vicious circle”.107 Not only do these problems undermine the trust in regulatory 
institutions, they also increasingly prevent greater rational regulation.108 Causes of such problems are 
attributed to public perceptions, statutory actions and reactions and uncertainties in the technical 
regulatory process.109 As a way of resolving these problems, institutional changes which reflect the 
opinion that a “depoliticised regulatory process might produce better results” would be required.110 
Baldwin and Cave contrast the approach advanced by Breyer to that of Shrader-Frechette. In their 
view, Shrader-Frechette’s approach, as a means of legitimation, is significant.111 Furthermore, its 
support for the stance that risk analyses must be carried out within framework of greater “participation 
and accountability” – which can be contrasted with Breyer’s focus on expertise, contribute to its 
significance.112 
 
 
Regulatory Developments in the European Union 
 
Regulatory failures in EU member states,113 public’s preference for risk aversion and increased EU 
regulatory powers are developments which are considered to have played a part in determining the 
current regulatory direction of the EU.114 Three developments which have controversially resulted in 
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namely that, such strategy: 
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the present systemic approach to risk analysis in the EU include some high profile risk management 
failures at the national level and apparent lack of interaction between the national and EU level; the 
governance crisis at the EU level and the growing dependence by the EU on the precautionary 
principle.115  
 
 
Hedge Funds and their Significance in Risk Regulation 
 
The European Commission’s Consultation Document on Hedge Funds116 should contribute to a 
consideration of the appropriateness of existing approaches to regulation and supervision of the hedge 
funds sector.117 In terms of assets which are managed by the global fund industry, hedge funds have 
increased 50 times since 1990.118 Recently, trading by hedge funds has constituted more than 50% of 
the daily trading volume in equities markets.119 The impact of activities of highly leveraged investment 
vehicles on the stability of the financial system, in addition to perceived lack of transparency of hedge 
funds, has contributed to concerns over hedge funds.120 On a global basis, hedge fund related assets 
attained a maximum level of $2 trillion in 2007.121 
 
Three of the questions which constitute the focus of the Consultation Document and which are 
relevant to the purposes of this paper, along with responses to these questions, will be discussed.122 
The questions are as follows:123 
 
Does recent experience require a reassessment of the systemic relevance of hedge funds?124 
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Is the 'indirect regulation' of hedge fund leverage through prudential requirements on prime 
brokers still sufficient to insulate the banking system from the risks of hedge fund failure? Do we 
need alternative approaches?125 
Is the 'indirect regulation' of hedge fund leverage through prudential requirements on prime 
brokers still sufficient to insulate the banking system from the risks of hedge fund failure? Do we 
need alternative approaches? 
 
 
 
Up till now, regulatory focus has been directed towards ensuring that bankruptcy relating to hedge 
funds, does not trigger further systemic crisis in other parts of the financial sector.126 From the 
responses obtained, a significant percentage of these were of the opinion that adequate bank 
capitalization structures were in place to contain consequences of a hedge fund crisis.127 Furthermore, 
the results not only revealed that prime brokers were equipped with risk management tools which 
would shield them from counter party risks, but that respondents also considered the prudential 
requirements to which prime brokers were subject, to be stringent.128 
 
In relation to indirect regulation, criticism was directed not only at its inability to account for the fact 
that different hedge funds may mimic each other’s procedures, but that they could also be similarly 
affected by common market developments.129 
 
 
 
Do prudential authorities have the tools to monitor effectively exposures of the core financial 
system to hedge funds, or the contribution of hedge funds to asset price movements? If not, what 
types of information about hedge funds do prudential authorities need and how can it be 
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In order to improve transparency during its dealings with authorities, recommendations of a single, 
global registeration procedure for hedge funds and their managers, were put forward by some 
respondents.131 In addition, to the requirement of the submission of periodic regulatory reports on size, 
investment style, exposures, leverage and performance, some respondents recommended that such 
process of information collection should involve hedge fund managers, as well as prime brokers, the 
valuator, the clearing broker or other prominent counter parties – as prudential authorities may not 
possess adequate facilities to monitor effectively exposures of the financial system to hedge funds or 
its contribution to asset price movements.132 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In explaining why risk has become so central in governmental and regulatory circles, this paper has 
attempted to highlight the interconnected nature between risk and regulation and also illustrate how 
risk can serve as a regulatory tool. Conversely regulation, if properly implemented, should to an 
extent, be able to address the challenges posed by risk. Through its knowledge generating capacity, 
regulation could serve as a means of resolving challenges and problems generated by risk.133 In 
addition to the recommendations put forward in the concluding section of the paper, a focus on 
institutional risks as well as hedge funds, the successful management of these – including those risks 
emanating from risk management, greater transparency measures, should assist regulators in 
addressing the challenges presented in regulating risk. 
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